Bordetella pertussis DNA, (2) isolation of B pertussis, or (3) epidemiologic linkage to a laboratory-confirmed case. We reviewed records of infants with pertussis in NICU A, assessed the infant's age at the time of cough or apnea onset, investigated potential sources of transmission, and mapped case locations. This study underwent review by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) Scientific Education and Professional Development Program Office.
Hospital Costs
We assessed Hospital A costs (tetanus toxoid, reduced diphtheria toxoid, and acellular pertussis [Tdap] booster vaccine, vaccine administration, postexposure prophylaxis [PEP] , and laboratory and labor costs) incurred in controlling the outbreak. Cost of Tdap vaccine ($29/dose) and administration ($10/administration) for HCPs were obtained from the CDC. The hospital acquisition price for PEP ($13.16 for azithromycin; $9 for trimethoprimsulfamethoxazole) was used. HCP furlough costs were calculated by multiplying the number of days in furlough, the number of HCPs furloughed, and a normal work shift (8 hours/day) by mean hourly earnings for full-time Arizona hospital HCPs ($35.48) [4] . Costs incurred by other institutions were not included.
RESULTS

Descriptive Epidemiology
Forty infants were hospitalized in NICU A from July 28, 2011 to September 19, 2011; parents of 35 of these infants (88%) were interviewed. Of 39 NICU A HCPs furloughed for cough illness, 35 (90%) were interviewed. We identified 15 pertussis cases including 5 infants (Table 1) and 10 NICU A HCPs. Three cases were laboratoryconfirmed at HealthCare Clinical Laboratories (Stockton, CA) by PCR or isolation by culture. The remaining 12 cases were confirmed with compatible clinical findings and by epidemiologic linkage to NICU A.
Exposure and Contact Investigations
The index case occurred in a 4-week-old female who had been born at 28 weeks gestation and resided at NICU A from June 25, 2011 to September 9, 2011. She experienced apnea (ascribed to gastroesophageal reflux disease) on July 28, 2011; pertussis was not suspected. From August 7, 2011 to August 9, 2011, the patient had been located adjacent to Patients 2 and 3; the distance between NICU A beds where they were co-located was 16 inches; all 3 infants had shared the same 2 nurses during this time. The index patient's cough began on August 14, 2011 and lasted 26 days; she had not been isolated at any time during her admission at NICU A.
The index patient's illness was confirmed after transfer to Hospital B on September 9, 2011 when a nasopharyngeal swab collected on September 14, 2011 was positive by pertussis PCR; B pertussis was isolated by culture 1 week later. The index patient received azithromycin on September 14, 2011 (32 days after cough onset, and 49 days after apnea onset). Diagnosis of Patients 2-5 were similarly delayed (Table 1) 
Site Visit and Location Mapping
Two of 8 sinks in the area where the index patient and Patients 2 and 3 had been located were obstructed by carts and trash cans. Infants were routinely moved within the unit, and infant location had not been accurately recorded. Hospital policy requiring HCPs with acute respiratory illness to take personal leave had not been enforced. NICU visitors were not screened for cough illness before entry, and no signage was posted requesting ill visitors to refrain from entering NICU A. 
DISCUSSION
This healthcare-associated pertussis outbreak with 15 identified cases cost 1 hospital approximately $100 000. Forty infants hospitalized in a NICU were exposed to pertussis and required PEP. This investigation adds to prior work documenting costs incurred by hospitals responding to pertussis outbreaks and the ease with which pertussis can be transmitted within the healthcare setting [3, 5, 11] . In 2 Washington outbreaks, the hospital cost per case ranged from $30 282 to $43 893 [6] , which is considerably more than the approximately $6500 per case associated with NICU A.
Multiple factors contributed to this healthcareassociated pertussis outbreak. First, delays occurred in diagnosis and isolation of cases. Delayed diagnosis of infections has been identified as one of the most important factors in prolonged healthcare-associated outbreaks [7] . Second, infants were located in close proximity to one another and shared the same nurse when 1 infant was infectious. Third, HCPs worked during cough illness, and fourth, visitors entered the NICU when ill. Previous pertussis outbreaks have been attributed to cough illness among hospital visitors [8] ; however, after outbreaks in high-risk settings (eg, nurseries), visitor screening for cough has been successfully implemented to prevent infants' exposure. Limiting staff and visitor access to high-risk areas and discouraging parents from having contact with infants other than their own infant are additional strategies to be considered [9] .
Lack of HCP pertussis vaccination documentation contributed to costs associated with this outbreak. HCP vaccination can protect against pertussis and thereby reduce spread and costs associated with pertussis outbreak management [3] . The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommends the Tdap booster vaccine be administered to HCPs, and recorded, especially for HCPs working with infants aged 12 months, because of the increased risk for acquiring pertussis in the healthcare setting and potential for transmitting pertussis to highrisk patients [10] .
One limitation of this study was an underestimation of outbreak-related costs because costs related to liability or increased duration of hospitalization were not included. First, costs incurred by state and local health departments, private and public insurance, another receiving hospital, or indirect costs borne by patients and families were not included. Second, we were unable to interview and apply the case definition to NICU A visitors because visitor information was not documented by the hospital. Third, the primary mode of healthcare-associated transmission during this outbreak could not be discerned because of poorly defined pertussis symptom onset, especially among HCPs. Transmission might have included patient-to-HCP, patient-to-patient, patient-to-visitor, and HCP-to-patient transmission. Although infants usually do not have a strong enough cough to reach other patients, the close proximity of neonates in NICU A, especially when being handled by HCPs during feeding, increases the possibility of patient-to-patient spread in this outbreak. Regardless of how the index patient became infected, our data indicate that transmission to 2 other infants occurred in NICU A.
This costly healthcare-associated pertussis outbreak might have been precipitated by the lack of strategies needed to prevent the spread of vaccine-preventable diseases to vulnerable populations in medical settings, including: (1) increasing pertussis awareness among providers, especially among patient populations who present with apnea (eg, infants); (2) convenient access and documenting of pertussis vaccine for HCPs; (3) allowing only HCPs with evidence of pertussis booster vaccine to provide care to infants aged 6 months; and (4) screening visitors for cough illness upon entry to the NICU [9, 12] , and instituting a screening plan to identify suspected pertussis cases for immediate isolation. 
